Mr. O’Brien and I seem to have a knack for giving each other post ideas–probably because we tend to be interested in the same things (I’m an actor/writer too). This time I was reading his comments on the James O’Keefe debate–or rather, the broader debate among Catholics about the ethics of lying. This post is not a disagreement with his (I share his dismay at the cavalier attitude some Catholics take towards Church teaching), but an exploration of some related questions.
The same afternoon I read Mr. O’Brien’s post I was approached by a fellow Catholic on this very problem: lying/acting in the context of O’Keefe’s Planned Parenthood reporting. I gave an answer with which I was not entirely satisfied; so that evening I brought the question up with my father, and got another not-quite-satisfying answer. In the interests of the debate, here are both answers. (Kudos to anyone who can figure out which was mine and which was my father’s!)
First, let’s look at some definitions.
Catechism 2482-5. “‘A lie consists in speaking a falsehood with the intention of deceiving.’ [St. Augustine, De mendacio 4,5:PL 40:491] . . . To lie is to speak or act against the truth in order to lead someone into error. . . . [A] lie offends against the fundamental relation of man and of his word to the Lord. The gravity of a lie is measured against the nature of the truth it deforms, the circumstances, the intentions of the one who lies, and the harm suffered by its victims. If a lie in itself only constitutes a venial sin, it becomes mortal when it does grave injury to the virtues of justice and charity. By its very nature, lying is to be condemned.”
Summa Q.110. “[I]f these three things concur, namely, falsehood of what is said, the will to tell a falsehood, and finally the intention to deceive, then there is falsehood–materially, since what is said is false, formally, on account of the will to tell an untruth, and effectively, on account of the will to impart a falsehood. However, the essential notion of a lie is taken from formal falsehood, from the fact namely, that a person intends to say what is false; wherefore also the word mendacium [lie] is derived from its being in opposition to the mind. . . . Now a lie is evil in respect of its genus, since it is an action bearing on undue matter. For as words are naturally signs of intellectual acts, it is unnatural and undue for anyone to signify by words something that is not in his mind. Hence the Philosopher [Aristotle] says (Ethic. iv, 7) that ‘lying is in itself evil and to be shunned, while truthfulness is good and worthy of praise.’ Therefore every lie is a sin, as also Augustine declares (Contra Mend. i).”
Both texts, caveats included, essentially boil down to this: “Lying is intentionally uttering a falsehood with the intent to deceive. Lying is always wrong.”
Given these texts, here are two possible defenses of “acting a lie.”
Defense 1. “Lying is intentionally uttering a falsehood with the intent to deceive.” But what is a falsehood? St. Thomas and the Catechism seem to agree (read further in the above links) that the intent to deceive is only sinful when the person(s) being deceived deserve the truth. (Thus, I can deceive or mislead the Nazis hunting for Jews, etc., though I cannot lie to them.) Intentional false statements, on the other hand, are always sinful. However, most moralists agree that “intentional false statements” do not include statements such as those routinely made by actors. (The partial defense that O’Brien gave of O’Keefe at the Chesterton Conference was based on this fact.) The key question is: Why are actors traditionally considered not to be making “intentional false statements”?
If you say that actors are not liars because everyone knows they’re acting, then O’Keefe’s in trouble. But look carefully again at what Aquinas says in Article 3 of the Question: “Now a lie is evil . . . [because it] bear[s] on undue matter. For . . . it is unnatural and undue for anyone to signify by words something that is not in his mind.” When one acts, one “takes up” the mind of the person one is portraying; their mind is in your mind. The words are not lies, not because everyone knows you are acting (if a five-year-old child walks into the theater, and thinks it’s for real, you haven’t lied to him) but because you are conveying to your audience not specific truths (“There is a murderer in that closet!”) but general truths (“This character is the sort of man who would say, under these circumstances, ‘There is a murderer in that closet!'”) Now if acting is not lying; and if it is permissible to deceive some persons (for example, as Aquinas says, in war); then it may be permissible to deceive persons through acting; i.e., through portraying a personality other than one’s own. Although the statements made in the course of such a portrayal are untrue in a narrow sense (not literal–but neither is all the Bible!) they are not false in the broader sense (they fit what this character would say).
Defense 2. Who has a right to the truth? The above commentary is mere hair-splitting. If it required brains that subtle to deceive the Nazis, then your average joe would really be up a creek. There is nothing wrong with telling untruths to persons who have no right to the truth, just as there is nothing wrong with killing in self defense. Sure, it’s better to avoid untruths and killing as long as you can; but neither prohibition is absolute.
Now Aquinas is a smart guy, but even Aquinas is not always right. (He got a relatively important thing like the Immaculate Conception wrong, so let’s not be surprised if he occasionally is a bit off base on something else.) The Catechism is another matter. It is authoritative, and it cannot be ignored. However, the Catechism is primarily a pastoral document, intended as a guide to people’s daily behavior. Saying something such as “Lying is telling an untruth to someone who has a right to know the truth” (as the authors of an earlier canceled edition of the Catechism did), would open the gates for a vast number of people to tell untruths when they had no business doing so. (We all know how human nature works. “She had no right to know where I was last night; and she wouldn’t take silence for an answer!”) The canceled edition of the Catechism is not less likely to be inerrant than the current one; the fact that it was canceled merely suggests that it was considered to be possibly misleading to members of the faithful.
As I say, I find neither of these solutions completely satisfying; and of course, neither one is an exoneration of O’Keefe. We can’t read his conscience; but he himself has said that he thinks the end (uncovering the truth) justifies the means (lying)–which is certainly bad theology and ethics. Nor does either of these defenses excuse O’Keefe from the other scandals that he’s been involved with. But maybe, just maybe, one of them could explain how good people can . . . spy? equivocate? act?; etc., etc.
Thoughts?
Hey, here’s great stuff on the Catechism by my friend Joe Grabowski:
“Let me get out of abstraction and make it plain: Tollefsen is exempt from the specious argument group because his approach has obviously digested the big scope of where the Catechism comes from and where it fits in to the pastoral theological agenda of the Magisterium. He really seems to be familiar with the whole scope of JP II’s leadership in moral theology – the “spirit” of Veritatis Splendor – and he also makes use of ethical and philosophical approaches that represent a good background, because that’s where a lot of the debate among working religious ethicists takes place.
The norms of the Catechism, and the explanations offered, are sound. But they require elucidation and explanation. And when interpretation is left to the reader, the only real way to do this reliably is to try to gain a sense of the mind of the Church and the way in which the spirit of the Tradition is moving. The Magisterium doesn’t put theology out there as an end in itself. As much as people like to poo-poo the “Pastoral” paradigm of Vatican II, there’s a funny way in which all good theology is ULTIMATELY directed at a “Pastoral” concern. The Catechism seeks to explicate Doctrine for the formation of conscience and to guide people to make good decisions.
So, I would say if a person reading the Catechism carefully went out and acted on a notion they took from it in good conscience, they are sound. But here’s the distinction: it’s when it comes to *argument* that you have to get out of the Catechism alone. Because what’s presented there, as far as argument is concerned, can’t be simply interpreted or understood in terms of what it “is” on the page, but what it’s trying to “do”. And the only way you can get at that is to put your finger on the pulse of the theological discipline you’re dealing with and see what motivated the kinds of articulation in the Catechism – such as the removal of the clause about “right to the truth” from the definition of lying in the second edition.”
Defense #2 must be categorically and in its entirety rejected. One cannot play Anthony Kennedy with the Catechism. The draft of a magisterial document is not itself the magisterial document. First, maintaining that it is yields a shockingly illogical result: as demonstrated here, it leaves the Church teaching A and -A at the same time.
Second, it would expose the analysis of moral questions to uncertainty of the highest order. Suppose we examine the papers of Ven. Pius XII that he wrote prior to promulgating the dogma of the Assumption. Let us assume that at the top of one document, His Holiness wrote “Dogma of the Assumption”; underneath, however, instead of drafting a fully definition of the dogma, he wrote a few key phrases about it and then jotted a poem about Roman water fountains. If every draft of a magisterial document were itself magisterial, where does Pius XII’s poem leave us? It leaves us in a world where there can be no certainty about the teaching, authority, or requirements of Christ’s Church, and where absurd examples hold judgment hostage.
Third, it is simply not true that a document such as the Catechism is strictly a pastoral document. I would not go so far as to say that the Catechism is strictly a legal document that has re-promulgated the entire law of the magisterium, but it is at least a reference to the places where the magisterium has promulgated law. Because it offers authoritative interpretations of moral questions about which there are competing ideas, it is itself within the ordinary magisterium (a statement of the pope together and in union with the college of bishops about a matter of faith and morals). Therefore, its contents (and not the contents that it does not have, or the contents of some other related document) are due reverent submission of mind and will (or whatever similar standard governs items in the o.m.; I’m not looking it up).
Fourth, there are numerous smaller criticisms: e.g., reverse-engineering draft language into a document like this is a refuge of scoundrels; it comes very close to questioning the teaching authority and capacity of the Church in toto and accuses the Holy See of being either patronizing or mendacious and derelict of duty regardless.
The comparison to self-defense as a justification for lying in some circumstances is a shoddy canard. Any worthwhile consideration of the moral legitimacy of killing in self-defense would demonstrate as much. Murder is always wrong; it is merely that some killings made in self-defense are not murder. The rule is not “don’t kill people unless you have to”; the rule is “do not murder, ever.”
Lying, likewise, is always wrong. It may be that some version of argument 1, applied in light of all the facts, would reveal that what the individuals in question did was not lying. If it was lying, it was evil, and no consequentialist reasoning will alter that. If it was not lying, it certainly was not because of any argument made in defense #2.
Titus, I think Defense 2 is a bit more subtle than that. The defender is not defending lying but “telling untruths,” which the defender sees as a different thing. Ultimately the grounds for that defense rest on the notion that the Catechism’s definition of a “falsehood” does not embrace all non-literal statements. I think this brings the case much closer to the killing/murder analogy.
I’d also point out that defender #2 does not make the claim that the Catechism is “strictly” a pastoral document, but that it is “primarily” a pastoral document. Since the Catechism itself states (see the prologue) that it is intended for catechesis of the faithful, I think pastoral considerations must have had some weight in determining its phrasing. I don’t think there would be anything patronizing in the Church’s doctrine developing (see Newman) at a pace appropriate for its members’ understandings.
Finally, questioning the sincerity of the defender does not move the argument forward. All other considerations aside, I’ve as much as said that the ideas expressed where either (a) my own or (b) those of my father . . . and I can assure you that both of us where quite sincere. If one or both of us are wrong–well, then we’re wrong!; but neither of us was willingly or consciously contradicting the magisterium.
questioning the sincerity of the defender
Well, I certainly did not intend to question anyone’s sincerity or delve into ad hominem attacks. I did opine that the manner of argument proposed was “a refuge of scoundrels”: but I don’t think that phrase is generally understood as insinuating that the person deploying the argument is necessarily a scoundrel personally, just that he’s advancing an unbecoming and unconvincing position.
I’m certainly not accusing anyone of heresy based on a summarized argument in a single paragraph: I’m perfectly willing to presume that a person making argument #2 would gladly submit to the Church’s authority if She were to come out and authoritatively resolve the question for us. Nor did I intend to imply otherwise by mentioning the standards of obedience: merely that if I am correct that the Catechism as written is part of the ordinary magisterium, there are resulting obligations on our part. Perhaps I shouldn’t have mentioned consequentialism—I do see it condemned in the last paragraph of the original post.
Regardless, I don’t think the proposer is insincere or vicious; I simply think he is wrong.
Comprendo.
Quite understandable, Mr. O’Brien! I know the internet . . .
Good points from Mr. Grabowski! I really think both he and your priest friend are right: the Catechism is definitely magisterial but also partly pastoral. But I must admit, personally, that I am still uncomfortable with Defense #2 (and #1, if it comes to that). I would use either of them to defend a friend, but I would be very reluctant to take either one as a justification for my own behavior.
But then, I’m not a small, confused child facing Nazis (or the Walsinghamsian spies of Dena’s example)!
Thanks, Sophia – and Titus.
I know of at least one priest who is a moral theologian who says not only is the Catechism a document of magisterial authority, but of very high magisterial authority – and certainly not merely a pastoral document (it doesn’t even claim to be merely that; read JPII’s introduction to it). Its authority is probably higher than the authority of individual Papal Encyclicals. Why? Because one Papal Encyclical is not as authoritative as all Papal Encyclicals taken together, along with writings of the Fathers, Scripture, and so forth – culled and compelled by the magisterium itself – which is exactly what the Catechism is.
And interestingly, Sophia, the first edition of the CCC said that a lie was telling an untruth to a person who had a right to hear the truth. All editions since have DELIBERATELY CUT that statement. Another theologian friend of mine says this is because moral theology since the War has rejected that qualification; that a better and more developed definition of lying is what the CCC now gives.
Sorry, Sophia, I addressed in my comment something you covered in your post. It’s late and I’m bouncing all around the internet in this whirlwind. Forgive the confusion.
Today I posted my most contraversial post in my two years on Facebook. What was it? A quote from the Catechism.
“A good intention (for example, that of helping one’s neighbor) does not make behavior that is intrinsically disordered, such as lying and calumny [slander], good or just. The end does not justify the means” (CCC 1753).
131 comments on it, 12 hours after posting it, many from conservative Catholics who are furious that this is what the Catechism teaches.